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IntroductIon
In June 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States issued rulings in two 
cases dealing with issues of same-sex couples’ constitutional rights to marry and 
to have their marriages recognized. In Hollingsworth v. Perry, the Court failed 
to reach the merits of the question whether California’s initiative that amended 
the state constitution to strip same-sex couples of their right to marry violated the 
Constitution of the United States; instead, the Court dismissed the case because 
the ballot sponsors attempting to appeal their losses in the federal district court 
and court of appeals lacked standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.1 In 
United States v. Windsor, the Court held unconstitutional Section 3 of the so-called 
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which had purported to define “marriage” for 
federal law purposes as a “union of one man and one woman,” requiring the federal 
government to ignore the marriages many same-sex couples had by then entered in 
various U.S. states or other countries.2
In Windsor’s wake we have seen a metaphoric “tidal wave” of litigation3 in 
every state that still excludes same-sex couples from marriage, as well as Puerto 
Rico, brought by same-sex couples seeking the right to marry under the Due Process
1.     133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
2.     133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
3.     Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546 & n.6 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
* Professor of Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law. I am grateful to 
my fellow panelists and the audience at the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality Sym-
posium, “Social Equality: ‘At Home and Abroad,’” where I presented an earlier version of this 
Article on a panel on “Equality in Marriage and the Family,” and to Steve Greene, for their 
helpful comments and questions, as well as to Melissa Shinto and Kyle Jones for their excellent 
research assistance.
and/or Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. As of Labor Day 2014, the 
cases that had ruled on preliminary or final relief for same-sex couples seeking to 
secure the right to marry or to live their lives as a married couple in their home states 
after marrying elsewhere have unanimously ruled in favor of marriage equality/
same-sex couples’ access to civil marriage; with but three outliers alongside fifty-
seven marriage equality vindications in such cases as of December 8, 2014, almost 
ninety-five percent of post-Windsor cases have supported marriage equality.4
Part I of this Article sketches the virtually unbroken string of pro-marriage 
decisions between Windsor and Labor Day 2014 to give a sense of the size and 
magnitude of this “tidal wave” of precedent. Next, Part II briefly explores some of 
the reasons that might help account for the flood of litigation and overwhelmingly 
positive outcomes. Part III tentatively suggests one way this flow of decisions in 
favor of marriage equality might influence the Supreme Court when it returns to the 
issue, and then shows one particular aspect of Windsor’s wake: the way it has helped 
lower federal courts nearly unanimously conclude that doctrinal developments after 
the Supreme Court summarily rejected a same-sex couple’s constitutional claims to 
a right to marry in Baker v. Nelson in 19725 have rendered that decision no longer 
dispositive. Although Baker would in no event prevent the Supreme Court itself 
from revisiting the constitutional issues, the ability to declare Baker doctrinally 
undermined has positive repercussions for the social equality and lived reality of 
same-sex couples across the country in the meantime. Finally, Part IV of the Article 
addresses some of the ways in which United States v. Windsor itself developed 
4.     See Adam Polaski, Federal Judge in Mississippi Rules Marriage Ban Unconstitutional, 
Freedom to marry (Nov. 25, 2014, 9:08 PM), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/blog/entry/
federal-judge-in-mississippi-rules-marriage-ban-unconstitutional (“[The November 25, 2014, 
federal district court ruling holding Mississippi’s marriage ban unconstitutional was] the 56th 
court ruling since June 2013 in favor of the freedom to marry. Just four courts—most nota-
bly, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit—upheld marriage discrimination. Plaintiffs 
from the 6th Circuit cases, out of Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee, are now seeking 
review from that out-of-step ruling from the United States Supreme Court. The plaintiffs in 
a case out of Louisiana, where a federal judge upheld marriage discrimination in September, 
are also seeking Supreme Court review.”); see also Marriage Rulings in the Courts, Freedom 
to marry http://www.freedomtomarry.org/pages/marriage-rulings-in-the-courts (last updated 
Dec. 8, 2014) (“There have been 57 victories for the freedom to marry since June 2013, when 
the U.S. Supreme Court struck down the core of the so-called Defense of Marriage Act in 
Windsor v. United States. Thirty-six pro-marriage rulings have been issued in federal court, 
sixteen have been issued in state court, and five have been issued by a federal appellate court. 
. . . In four cases, judges have upheld laws denying the freedom to marry to same-sex couples: 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit upheld bans in KY, MI, OH and TN; federal 
judges have upheld discrimination in Louisiana and Puerto Rico; and a Tennessee state court 
case denied respect for a couple’s marriage for the purpose of the marriage’s dissolution.”). 
The Tennessee couple was not seeking the right to live together as a married couple. See infra 
text accompanying notes 163−68.
5.     409 U.S. 810 (1972).
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constitutional doctrine in ways that advance the cause of constitutional justice and 
same-sex couples’ rights to equal protection and to marry.
I. the torrent oF Windsor’s Wake
United States v. Windsor was decided June 26, 2013.6 Less than a month later, 
on July 22, an Ohio federal court in Obergefell v. Kasich, relying on Windsor and 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, granted a preliminary 
injunction requiring the state to recognize the Maryland marriage of an Ohio 
couple, one of whom was terminally ill.7 On September 27, a New Jersey court in 
Garden State Equality v. Dow relied on Windsor to hold that civil unions failed to 
provide same-sex couples the full equality required by the state constitution;8 when 
New Jersey chose not to appeal, marriage equality became the law in the Garden 
State. On December 10, a federal court in Illinois in Lee v. Orr, following an earlier 
decision for one couple, relied on Windsor and the Equal Protection Clause to grant 
a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction requiring Illinois to let 
a class of medically critical plaintiffs marry in advance of the July 1 effective date 
for the new state law allowing same-sex couples to marry.9 Just over a week later, 
on December 19, New Mexico’s high court relied on Windsor to hold in Griego 
v. Oliver that the state constitution’s equal protection clause required same-sex 
couples be allowed to marry.10 The next day, December 20, a federal court in Utah 
in Kitchen v. Herbert relied on Windsor to grant summary judgment on federal equal 
protection and due process claims, requiring the state to let same-sex couples marry 
and to recognize their marriages from other jurisdictions11 and resulting in hundreds 
of couples marrying there before the U.S. Supreme Court eventually stepped in to 
stay the judgment pending appeal.12 Three days later, on December 23, the same 
federal judge in Ohio who ruled in Obergefell v. Kasich, now acting under the case 
name Obergefell v. Wymyslo (Obergefell II), granted a declaratory judgment and 
permanent injunction requiring Ohio to recognize marriages of same-sex couples 
from other states on death certificates—a conclusion which Judge Timothy Black 
said “flow[ed] from the Windsor decision of the United States Supreme Court.”13
After the public enjoyed a break for the holidays, on January 14, 2014, a 
federal court in Oklahoma decided Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, granting 
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs challenging the state’s marriage 
6.     133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
7.     No. 1:13-CV-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013).
8.     82 A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013).
9.     No. 13-CV-8719, 2013 WL 6490577 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 10, 2013).
10.     316 P.3d 865 (N.M. 2013).
11.     961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014).
12.     Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014).
13.     962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973 (S.D. Ohio 2013).
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exclusion laws, citing Windsor.14 Less than a month later, on February 12, a federal 
court in Kentucky in Bourke v. Beshear relied on Windsor and granted the plaintiff 
couple a final judgment requiring the state to recognize valid marriages of same-
sex couples from other jurisdictions as a matter of federal equal protection law.15 
The next day, a second federal court gave the country a Valentine’s present: On 
February 13 a Virginia federal court granted the plaintiffs summary judgment in 
Bostic v. Rainey,16 a marriage case joined by Prop 8-challenging attorneys Ted 
Olson and David Boies. It ruled, again relying on Windsor, that the Constitution 
requires Virginia to let same-sex couples marry and to recognize their marriages 
from other jurisdictions.17 A week-and-a-half later, on February 21, a federal court 
in Illinois granted unopposed final summary judgment in Lee v. Orr II requiring 
the state to allow marriage for all gay and lesbian couples in Cook County 
immediately, not July 1 when the state legislature’s new law opening civil marriage 
to same-sex couples was to go into effect.18 Less than a week later, on February 
26, a federal court in Texas in De Leon v. Perry relied on Windsor to grant the 
plaintiffs a preliminary injunction requiring the state to allow same-sex couples to 
marry and to recognize such marriages from other jurisdictions.19 Less than two-
and-a-half weeks after that, on March 14, a federal court in Tennessee in Tanco v. 
Haslam invoked Windsor in granting a preliminary injunction requiring interstate 
recognition of validly contracted marriages of three same-sex couples.20 The week 
after that, on March 21, a federal court in Michigan ruled in DeBoer v. Snyder, citing 
Windsor, and granting the plaintiffs a permanent injunction requiring marriage (and 
it seems, recognition of marriages from other jurisdictions)21 following a trial that 
eviscerated the junk science of Mark Regnerus.22
Three weeks plus a weekend later, on April 14, the same judge of the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio who ruled in the Obergefell litigation 
relied on Windsor and granted permanent injunctive relief in Henry v. Himes against 
any enforcement of Ohio’s laws refusing to recognize valid marriages of same-
sex couples contracted elsewhere, concluding that the state’s marriage recognition 
14.     962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1258, 1279, 1288, 1294, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 2014), aff’d and stay 
granted sub nom. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014).
15.     996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548−50 & n.14, 557−58 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
16.     970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 
(4th Cir. 2014).
17.     Id. at 475−76, 483−84.
18.     Lee v. Orr (Lee v. Orr II), No. 13-CV-8719, 2014 WL 683680 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2014).
19.     975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 639−40, 655, 659, 662 (W.D. Tex. 2014).
20.     7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. Tenn. 2014), stay denied sub nom. Jesty v. Haslam, No. 3:13-
CV-01159, 2014 WL 1117069 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 20, 2014).
21.     973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
22.     Id. at 765−66 (“The Court finds Regnerus’s testimony entirely unbelievable and not 
worthy of serious consideration.”).
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ban “is facially unconstitutional and unenforceable in any context whatsoever.”23 
Four days after that, relying on Windsor for both standing and its merits analysis, a 
federal court in Indiana granted a temporary restraining order requiring the state to 
recognize an out-of-state marriage of a lesbian couple, one of whom was diagnosed 
with terminal cancer, in Baskin v. Bogan.24 The court extended this to a preliminary 
injunction on May 8, relying on Windsor and post-Windsor district court decisions 
to find a likelihood of success.25 Five days later, a federal magistrate judge held 
Idaho’s marriage exclusion laws unconstitutional in Latta v. Otter, again relying 
on Windsor.26 Less than a week later, a different federal trial judge in Utah relied 
on Windsor in Evans v. Utah and preliminarily enjoined the state from denying 
recognition to those same-sex couples married lawfully between Kitchen v. Herbert 
and the Supreme Court’s issuance of a stay of that judgment.27 The same day as 
Evans, a federal district court in Geiger v. Kitzhaber relied on Windsor and held 
Oregon’s marriage exclusions unconstitutional.28 The next day, a federal district 
court relied on Windsor in ruling in Whitewood v. Wolf that Pennsylvania’s marriage 
exclusions were unconstitutional.29
Two-and-a-half weeks later, on June 6, in a different Wolf case, Wolf v. 
Walker, a federal court invoked Windsor and held Wisconsin’s marriage exclusions 
unconstitutional.30 Less than three weeks later the federal court in Baskin v. Bogan 
extended the preliminary injunction against Indiana’s marriage exclusions to a 
permanent injunction.31 The same day, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed Kitchen v. Herbert by a two-to-one vote, with the majority relying on 
Windsor.32 Six days later, on July 1, the federal court that ruled in Bourke v. Beshear 
extended its holding from interstate recognition to the right to enter into marriage in 
Kentucky, holding in the poetically named Love v. Beshear that the state’s marriage 
exclusion violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.33
Less than three weeks later, on July 18, the same U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit panel majority that struck down Utah’s marriage exclusions continued 
23.     14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1044 (S.D. Ohio 2014). The court did allow the parties to brief 
whether or not this injunction should be stayed pending appeal, id. at 1062 n.27, and on April 
16 granted such a stay of the facial invalidation but not of the injunctive relief as applied to 
the specific plaintiff couples. Henry v. Himes, No. 1:14-CV-129, 2014 WL 1512541 (S.D. 
Ohio Apr. 16, 2014).
24.     12 F. Supp. 3d 1137 (S.D. Ind. 2014). 
25.     Baskin v. Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1026−27 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
26.     19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1059−60, 1075−77, 1080, 1082, 1084−87 (D. Idaho 2014).
27.     21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1196−98, 1202−03, 1214−15 (D. Utah 2014).
28.     994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1138−39, 1147−48 (D. Or. 2014).
29.     992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 421, 424−26, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
30.     986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 986−87, 990−91, 1010, 1015, 1017−18, 1023−24 (W.D. Wis. 
2014).
31.     12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1164−65 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
32.     755 F.3d 1193, 1199, 1213−16, 1226, 1228 (10th Cir. 2014).
33.     989 F. Supp. 2d 536 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
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the summer loving, holding Oklahoma’s marriage exclusions unconstitutional in Bishop 
v. Smith.34 Ten days later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit became the 
second federal appeals court to hold state marriage exclusions unconstitutional, relying 
on Windsor and ruling two-to-one in Bostic v. Schaefer that Virginia’s exclusion of 
same-sex couples from civil marriage, like its earlier exclusion of different-race couples, 
violated the fundamental right to marry protected by the U.S. Constitution.35 Three-and-
a-half-weeks later, in the final marriage ruling before Labor Day 2014, a federal district 
court also invoked Windsor and granted same-sex couples a preliminary injunction 
against enforcement of Florida’s marriage exclusions.36
II. explanatIons For Windsor’s Wake
Why are we seeing what the Kentucky decision of Bourke v. Beshear called 
“a virtual tidal wave of . . . judicial judgments in other states [that] have repealed, 
invalidated, or otherwise abrogated state laws restricting same-sex couples’ access 
to marriage and marriage recognition”?37 Why are we seeing so much litigation and 
such uniformly positive results? The answers are probably overdetermined.
The post-Windsor precedential landscape may seem more striking due to 
the seeming rapidity with which it has been shaped by the lower courts—dozens of 
rulings with victories for marriage equality within fourteen months after Windsor. 
Some of this speed is genuine. Cincinnati couple James Obergefell and John Arthur 
flew to Maryland to marry on July 11 and secured a temporary restraining order on 
July 22;38 on September 26 an Ohio funeral director joined the suit as a plaintiff 
to broaden the scope of the litigation and eventual relief.39 The plaintiffs in the 
Illinois, Kentucky, Virginia, Tennessee, New Mexico, and Utah cases described 
above all filed their suits no earlier than the U.S. Supreme Court’s arguments in 
the marriage cases in March 2013. Other cases, however, preceded the Supreme 
Court’s consideration of Windsor. The original complaint in the Michigan case was 
filed in 2012;40 the New Jersey case in 2011;41 and the Oklahoma suit in 2004.42 
34.     760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014).
35.     760 F.3d 352, 377−79 (4th Cir. 2014).
36.     Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281, 1293 (N.D. Fla. 2014).
37.     996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
38.     Obergefell v. Kasich, No. 1:13–cv–501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *2, *7 (S.D. Ohio July 
22, 2013).
39.     See Second Amended Complaint for Temporary Restraining Order and Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (No. 13-cv-
501) (filed Sept. 26, 2013).
40.     Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Deboer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 
757 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (No. 2:12-cv-10285) (filed Jan. 23, 2012).
41.     Complaint, Garden State Equality v. Dow, 82 A.3d 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2013) 
(No. ML-001729-11) (filed June 29, 2011).
42.     Complaint, Bishop v. Oklahoma, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Okla. 2014) (No. 4:04-cv-
848) (filed Nov. 3, 2004).
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Windsor may thus be seen as an accelerator for these cases.
Although some of this litigation pre-dated Windsor, why are we seeing so 
much now—at least eighty-six cases in Puerto Rico and every state that did not allow 
same-sex couples to marry?43 The motivations of same-sex couples offer a partial 
explanation. Many same-sex couples want to marry. They want to secure the legal 
protections for their relationship, and for the children that many of them are raising, 
that marriage affords. Like Indiana marriage plaintiffs Lane Stumler and Michael 
Drury, they are sick of being treated as second-class citizens by governments that 
are supposed to serve us all:
Stumler, 66, said he is now motivated to stand up for his rights after 
seeing gay rights openly discussed each day in the media debating 
“my worth as a human being or trying to decide [if] the DNA I was 
born [with] disqualifies me from being equal to everyone else.”
Drury said public opinion has evolved to be more accepting of same-
sex couples, and he is ready for Indiana leaders to catch up.44 
They are sick of waiting, and they believe that justice delayed is justice denied. For 
example, as one news story reported:
[Another Indiana marriage plaintiff Jo Ann] Dale said U.S. vs. 
Windsor has caused a lot of confusion for same-sex couples trying 
to understand what their rights are, and it’s made some in Indiana 
impatient with the state’s stand against gay marriage. “Right now is 
the time,” she said. “Let’s clear it up. Let’s get it straightened out. 
Let’s make sure it is the same understanding everywhere.”45
Part of the wave of marriage equality litigation can be explained as 
the concerted effort of national advocacy organizations, loosely comparable 
to the campaign against segregation waged by the NAACP.46 In the words 
of the ACLU of Florida: 
43.     pendIng marrIage equalIty cases, lambda legal (2014), http://www.lambdalegal.
org/sites/default/files/pending_marriage_equality_cases_as_of_12-18.pdf (scorecard as of 
Dec. 18, 2014). 
44.     Gary Popp, Southern Indiana Couples Want Equal Rights in Same-Sex Suit, neWs 
& trIb. (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.newsandtribune.com/news/clark_county/p-m-update-
southern-indiana-couples-want-equal-rights-in/article_daef5e28-5444-51c9-823f-ce-
2ab961bd97.html.
45.     Id.
46.     Cf., e.g., Jennifer L. Levi, Paving the Road: A Charles Hamilton Houston Approach to 
Securing Trans Rights, 7 Wm. & mary J. Women & l. 5, 8−12 (2000) (describing NAACP 
campaign to overturn segregation).
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Following our victory last June in the Windsor case at the Supreme 
Court, which largely ended federal marriage discrimination . . . the 
ACLU has been organizing legislative and ballot initiatives and 
also building lawsuits across the country–so far in Pennsylvania, 
Virginia, North Carolina, and Oregon–to ensure that the case that 
reaches the Supreme Court next leads to the nationwide solution we 
are all working so hard for.47
And the advocacy organizations have understandably filed suits in many 
states that offer same-sex couples no relationship recognition following the 
seemingly baffled responses of several Justices at oral argument in the Prop 8 case 
Perry to suggestions that it rule narrowly that it is unconstitutional for states to 
offer same-sex couples everything but the official status of “marriage.” Justice 
Kennedy, for example, when Ted Olson asked the Court to invalidate all marriage 
bans, suggested: 
The rationale of the Ninth Circuit was much more narrow. It 
basically said that California, which has been more generous, more 
open to protecting same-sex couples than almost any State in the 
Union, just didn’t go far enough, and it’s being penalized for not 
going far enough. That’s a very odd rationale on which to sustain 
this opinion.48
Justices Alito, Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor all expressed similar 
sentiments. I believe this line of questioning reflected confusion between conditions 
sufficient for a marriage regime’s unconstitutionality and conditions necessary for 
unconstitutionality. That is, those challenging California’s Proposition 8 were not 
arguing that it was necessary to the unconstitutionality of a state’s relationship 
recognition laws that they offer same-sex couples all the same legal consequences 
but withhold the designation “marriage.” Rather, they were arguing that the existence 
of a parallel domestic partnership status under state law showed that the state had 
no functional justification for denying same-sex couples access to civil marriage 
and so sufficed to make California’s marriage exclusion unconstitutional. Be that 
as it may, the reactions of the Justices make sensible the targeting of states that do 
nothing for same-sex couples and their families for constitutional challenges after 
Perry and Windsor.
47.     John M. Becker, Six Couples Sue to Overturn Florida Marriage Ban, bIlerIco proJect 
(Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.bilerico.com/2014/01/six_couples_sue_to_overturn_florida_mar-
riage_ban.php.
48.     Transcript of Oral Argument at 42−43, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) 
(No. 12-144).
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Moreover, the successes in Windsor’s wake are themselves breeding further 
litigation: “Courts throughout the country are recognizing that this is an issue of 
basic dignity and fundamental fairness,” explained an attorney in one challenge 
to Florida’s marriage exclusion.49 In the words of the ACLU of Florida: “We are 
hopeful that the court hearing this case will agree with courts across the country 
that the Constitution requires that same-sex couples be permitted to marry.”50 An 
attorney for Indiana plaintiffs explained to the press: “We are asking the Indiana 
federal court to recognize what every other court in the country has recognized” 
since Windsor.51
III. the Impacts oF Windsor: the supreme court, the dynamIc meanIng oF 
Windsor, and the InsIgnIFIcance oF Baker v. nelson
         This Part addresses two aspects of the possible impact of United States 
v. Windsor. First, it briefly broaches the possibility that the meaning of Windsor 
will be determined in a dynamic process in which the spreading consensus on 
Windsor’s implications for state marriage exclusions will influence courts’—or at 
least the Supreme Court’s—future understanding of Windsor. Second, this Part in 
more detail evaluates lower courts’ near-unanimous conclusion that the Supreme 
Court’s summary 1972 decision in Baker v. Nelson, rejecting due process and 
equal protection challenges to state laws excluding same-sex couples from civil 
marriage, has been swept away by subsequent doctrinal developments. Although 
not every facet of the lower courts’ reasoning on this point is persuasive, most of 
the argument is sound, and these courts have been right not to let Baker preclude 
them from doing justice under the Constitution to the real people who have turned 
to them for vindication of their rights.
A. The Potential Relevance of Windsor to its Ultimate Meaning
Part of the reason I presented the extent of marriage equality precedent after 
United States v. Windsor in some detail in Part I above is that it is plausible that this 
dramatic consensus among the lower courts might influence the federal courts of 
appeals and even the U.S. Supreme Court in their resolution of the constitutionality 
or unconstitutionality of state marriage exclusions in Windsor’s wake. When the 
Supreme Court decides a case without a majority opinion,52 black letter doctrine 
49.     equal. Fla. Inst. & nat’l ctr. For lesbIan rIghts, sIx same-sex couples and equal-
Ity FlorIda InstItute FIle laWsuIt seekIng the Freedom to marry In FlorIda (2014), http://
eqfl.org/sites/default/files/images/pr012114.pdf.
50.     Becker, supra note 47.
51.     Popp, supra note 44.
52.     Windsor was decided by a majority opinion, but the analogical relevance of the discus-
sion above will be made explicit.
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from Marks v. United States is that “the holding of the Court may be viewed as 
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment[ ] on the 
narrowest grounds.”53 This means that the position of a plurality of Justices need 
not state the holding; a single Justice concurring in the judgment states the holding 
if her or his position is narrower. Yet the Marks inquiry is not as straightforward 
as that formulation might suggest, for the Court has never defined what makes 
reasoning narrow or the narrowest; “[c]onsequently, for decades, commentators 
and judges alike have vocally lamented the opacity of this instruction.”54
 Scholarship by Justin Marceau from the University of Denver, however, has 
argued that when the Supreme Court decides cases without a majority opinion, thus 
leaving the actual holding of the case up to contestation under Marks, the Supreme 
Court in future decisions tends to read such cases as holding in accordance with 
a plurality opinion if the lower courts have converged on that position. “If lower 
courts settle on the holding of a Supreme Court plurality, then the Court is likely 
to embrace that as the law of the land.”55 Thus, in Professor Marceau’s view, 
“the Marks rule is less a device for divining clear precedent and more profitably 
viewed as an invitation for a referendum among the lower courts on the statutory or 
constitutional question at issue.”56
 Windsor was not a plurality decision, but in not resolving the constitutionality 
of state marriage bans57 or refusals to give interstate recognition to same-sex 
couples’ marriages, and in delivering a doctrinally opaque opinion,58 Windsor may 
function like a plurality decision. The meaning of Windsor and of the constitutional 
guarantees of equality and liberty on which it rests need to be resolved.59 A consensus 
in the lower courts about Windsor could stiffen the resolve of some Justices to 
follow the Supreme Court’s logic where it leads, as even Justice Scalia recognized 
in his Windsor dissent60—which was cited, incidentally, by the district courts in 
53.     430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
54.     Justin Marceau, Plurality Decisions: Upward-Flowing Precedent and Acoustic Separa-
tion, 45 conn. l. rev. 933, 936 (2013).
55.     Id. at 965.
56.     Id. at 938.
57.     At least one version of this question was at issue in Hollingsworth v. Perry, though the 
Court ducked it by holding that the petitioners lacked standing to appeal from the trial court’s 
judgment in Perry. See 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
58.     E.g., Marc R. Poirier, “Whiffs of Federalism” in United States v. Windsor: Power, Lo-
calism, and Kulturkampf, 85 u. colo. l. rev. 935, 941 (2014) (“In Windsor, Justice Kennedy 
exercises considerable caution, refraining from articulating either a clear federalism rule or a 
clear equal protection or substantive due process liberty rule that would resolve the marriage 
equality question once and for all.”).
59.     Cf. David B. Cruz, “Amorphous Federalism” and the Supreme Court’s Marriage 
Cases, 47 loy. l.a. l. rev. 393, 441 (2014) (“[T]he meaning of Windsor for questions of 
interstate recognition will unfold with experience and time.”).
60.    [T]he view that this Court will take of state prohibition of same-sex marriage is 
indicated beyond mistaking by today’s opinion. . . .  [T]he real rationale of today’s opin-
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the Ohio,61 Utah,62 Oklahoma,63 Kentucky,64 Virginia,65 Pennsylvania,66 and Wisconsin67 
cases, as well as by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in the Virginia case.68
B. Flushing Baker v. Nelson as an Obstacle to Marriage Equality
      The proliferation of LGBT equality litigation could also be, in some measure, 
prompted by the development of constitutional doctrine in Windsor, although 
Windsor offered little to no explicit new constitutional equality law doctrine.69 The 
development of doctrine, however, is important, not just in trying to understand 
the phenomenon sweeping the courts of the nation in Windsor’s wake but also as a 
matter of constitutional doctrine.
 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Windsor,70 lower 
courts had reached differing conclusions concerning whether the Supreme Court’s 
1972 summary decision in Baker v. Nelson71 required lower courts to dismiss 
challenges to state marriage exclusions.72 Following Windsor, however, the federal 
ion . . .  is that DOMA is motivated by “‘bare . . . desire to harm’” couples in same-sex 
marriages. How easy it is, indeed how inevitable, to reach the same conclusion with 
regard to state laws denying same-sex couples marital status. . . . As far as this Court is 
concerned, no one should be fooled; it is just a matter of listening and waiting for the 
other shoe. 
United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709−10 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted).
61.     Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 973−74 & n.1 (S.D. Ohio 2013); Ober-
fegell v. Kasich, No. 1:13-cv-501, 2013 WL 3814262, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 22, 2013).
62.     Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 
(10th Cir. 2014).
63.     Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1278 (N.D. Okla. 2013), 
aff’d sub nom. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014).
64.     Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 548, 550 n.14 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
65.     Bostic v. Raney, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476 (E.D. Va. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Bostic v. 
Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014).
66.     Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 425−26 (M.D. Pa. 2014).
67.     Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 987, 996−97, 1010, 1017 (W.D. Wis. 2014), aff’d 
sub nom. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
68.     Bostic, 760 F.3d at 380.
69.     I put to one side the way in which Windsor articulated new doctrine regarding standing 
to appeal. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).  
70.     Id.
71.     409 U.S. 810 (1972).
72.     Compare, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 178−79 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Even if 
Baker might have had resonance for Windsor’s case in 1971, it does not today. . . . In the forty 
years after Baker, there have been manifold changes to the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
jurisprudence.”), and Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9, 17 n.4 (N.Y. 2006) (rejecting 
the claim that Baker bars New York courts from hearing the parallel claim under the parallel 
constitutional provision), with Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 
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courts, to reach the issue, have nearly unanimously held that Baker is no obstacle to 
adjudicating such challenges.73 While I believe the best understanding of doctrine 
F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Baker is precedent binding on us unless repudiated by subsequent 
Supreme Court precedent.”), Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 870−71 (8th 
Cir. 2006) (noting but not relying on Baker, which the court cited in its conclusion only after 
having conducted equal protection analysis of state constitutional amendment), McConnell 
v. United States, 188 F. App’x 540 (8th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (in suit by Baker plaintiffs 
seeking federal tax refund due to their supposed marriage, using merits determination in 
Baker as part of the basis, along with McConnell v. Nooner, 547 F.2d 54 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(per curiam), for issue preclusion against plaintiffs), Nooner, 547 F.2d at 56 (holding Baker 
plaintiffs “collaterally estopped from relitigating” their claim to be married to receive extra 
veteran’s educational benefits due to supposed spouse), Jackson v. Abercrombie, 884 F. Supp. 
2d 1065, 1070 (D. Haw. 2012) (“Plaintiffs’ claims [challenging state marriage exclusion] are 
foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s summary dismissal for want of a substantial federal ques-
tion in Baker.”), vacated as moot, Nos. 12-16995, 12-16998, 2014 WL 5088199 (9th Cir. Oct. 
10, 2014) (citing Hawaii Marriage Equality Act of 2013 as rendering decision moot), Sevcik 
v. Sandoval, 911 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1002–03 (D. Nev. 2012) (“[T]he present equal protection 
claim is precluded by Baker insofar as the claim does not rely on the Romer line of cases . . . 
.”), Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1304−05 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (holding Baker binding 
as to nonexistence of “fundamental right to enter into a same-sex marriage” and so dismissing 
claims that federal non-recognition of marriage of lawfully married same-sex couple pursuant 
to Defense of Marriage Act violates the Constitution, though curiously proceeding to analyze 
and reject plaintiffs’ claim on their merits), Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 
(C.D. Cal. 1980) (deeming Baker “controlling” in federal immigration case involving putative 
marriage of same-sex couple in Colorado, though failing even to note “subsequent doctrinal 
developments” exception), Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (using 
Baker as persuasive merits precedent as to U.S. Constitution in case involving solely claims 
of right to marry under state constitution and descriptively/predictively opining that “[t]he 
five justices of the Lawrence [v. Texas] majority, as well as Justice O’Connor in her concur-
ring opinion, do not appear to be prepared to extend the logic of their reasoning to the recog-
nition of same-sex marriage”), Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 368, 369 n.2 (App. 
Div. 2005) (Catterson, J., concurring) (opposing majority which reached merits and asserting 
that plaintiffs’ equal protection challenge to marriage exclusion “is foreclosed by” Baker due 
to supposed equivalence of state and federal constitutional rights, relegating treatment of sub-
sequent doctrinal developments to one shallow sentence in footnote about Lawrence v. Texas), 
aff’d, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9, 17 n.4 (N.Y. 2006), and In re Cooper, 564 N.Y.S.2d 684, 685 (Sur. 
Ct. 1990) (concluding in case brought by surviving member of unmarried same-sex couple 
seeking an incident of marriage that “persons of the same sex have no constitutional rights to 
enter into a marriage with each other,” citing Baker as precedent but not even noting “subse-
quent doctrinal developments” rule), aff’d, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993) (using Baker 
as precedent supporting application of rational basis review to case where surviving member 
of unmarried same-sex couple sought an incident of marriage without stating that plaintiff’s 
constitutional claim in fact depended on a constitutional right to marry).
73.     See Mark Strasser, When a Baker Summary Dismissal Becomes Stale: On Same-Sex 
Marriage Bans and Federal Constitutional Guarantees, 17 J. gender race & Just. 137, 162 
(2014) (“[S]ince Baker was decided, significant developments in equal protection and due 
process jurisprudence make it difficult to understand how courts can plausibly claim the deci-
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and the precedents is that Baker was not dispositive even before Windsor, this 
seems to be an area where Windsor has left a wake of legal repercussions.
sion binding.”). One federal court adhered to Baker in a pro se prison inmate’s case without 
addressing whether subsequent doctrinal developments have rendered Baker no longer bind-
ing. See Merritt v. Attorney Gen., No. 13-00215-BAJ-SCR, 2013 WL 6044329, at *2 (M.D. 
La. Nov. 14, 2013) (citing Baker for proposition that “the Constitution does not require States 
to permit same-sex marriages” without even acknowledging existence of subsequent doctrinal 
developments exception to binding force of summary rulings such as Baker). One state trial 
court claimed to have rejected the subsequent doctrinal developments contention, but in a 
logically weak argument that suggested he was leaving that issue to higher courts to resolve. 
See Borman v. Pyles-Borman, No. 2014-CV-36, 2014 WL 4251133 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Aug. 5, 
2014).
A federal district court in Puerto Rico held that Baker was binding and precluded liti-
gation over the constitutionality of state laws excluding same-sex couples from civil marriage 
in Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, No. 14-cv-1253, 2014 WL 5361987 (D.P.R. Oct. 21, 2014), 
yet it seemed to rely on precedents about adherence to Supreme Court decisions with opin-
ions, id. at *5 (quoting Rodriguez v. de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 
484 (1989), and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997)), to reject the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent doctrinal developments principle, Conde-Vidal, 2014 WL 5361987, at *9 (“Lower 
courts, then, do not have the option of departing from disfavored precedent under a nebu-
lous ‘doctrinal developments’ test.”). Conde-Vidal also misread Windsor as either having no 
bearing on the issue before the district court or actually supporting Puerto Rico: “If anything, 
Windsor . . . reaffirms the States’ authority over marriage, buttressing Baker’s conclusion that 
marriage is simply not a federal question.” Id. at *8 (emphasis added). Aside from its offering 
no argument that a federal territory such as Puerto Rico should have the same legislative au-
thority and independence as a state, whose existence is constitutionally guaranteed, the court 
here failed even to note that Windsor was hardly a simple ode to state choice in marriage 
laws. Instead, as courts treating Windsor as a subsequent doctrinal development have noted, 
Windsor repeatedly insisted that state exercises of authority over marriage must comport with 
constitutional restrictions. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2680, 2691, 2692.
And a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit apparently held in 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), that Baker was binding on lower courts and 
barred the court from ruling for the plaintiffs. Like the Puerto Rico District Court, Judge 
Jeffrey Sutton’s majority opinion in DeBoer “ignores the Supreme Court’s reasoning about 
dignity and equality in U.S. v. Windsor[,] . . . treating the opinion as if it were only about 
federalism. He then uses Supreme Court pronouncements about decisions on the merits as an 
excuse to impose new rules for lower courts to handle summary dispositions (orders issued 
with no opinion or other explanation). Given that little feat of what some might term judicial 
activism, it’s a bit cheeky of him to insinuate that all of the many judges who have ruled in 
favor of marriage equality have behaved lawlessly, ‘aggressively . . .  assum[ing] authority 
to overrule Baker [them]selves.’” David B. Cruz, Sixth Circuit Marriage Decision Shuns 
Constitutional Law, Reprints Election Results, cruzlInes (Nov. 8, 2014), http://cruz-lines.
blogspot.com/2014/11/ sixth-circuit-marriage-decision-shuns.html. Also, if he really thought 
his Baker analysis correct, then what follows in his opinion would be twenty-five pages of 
dicta. David B. Cruz, 25 Pages of Dicta, or What the Supreme Court Could Say to the Sixth 
Circuit, cruzlInes (Nov. 7, 2014), http://cruz-lines.blogspot.com/2014/11/25-pages-of-dicta-
or-what-supreme-court.html.
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 Ultimately, the Supreme Court will almost certainly be the court to rule 
definitively upon whether the Constitution forbids states from excluding same-
sex couples from civil marriage and refusing to recognize the marriages they have 
entered in an increasing number of states or countries. For the Court, a more than 
four-decades-old summary disposition is likely to pose no obstacle to consideration 
of those constitutional questions on the merits. And, if Justice Ginsburg’s assessment 
is correct, the Court will do so soon, ruling no later than the end of June 2016.74 
Nonetheless, whether lower courts are bound by Baker is a vitally important question.
 Although broad judicial invalidations of many states’ marriage bans have 
been stayed to allow defenders to seek Supreme Court review, in a number of 
cases courts have ruled that individuals who have terminal illnesses may marry 
without delay.75 Every day that same-sex couples are denied the right to marry 
or recognition of their marriage, they and their families suffer injuries, but the 
potential for grievous, irreparable injury where one is terminally ill is not a mere 
contingency—anyone could have a fatal accident and be robbed of all opportunity 
to marry—but a near certainty.
 In Baker, a same-sex couple challenged Minnesota’s refusal to let them 
marry on grounds that it violated their constitutional rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, including their fundamental right to marry and their right to equal 
protection of the laws.76 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the claims, and 
the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the couple’s appeal on the ground that it did 
not present a substantial federal question.77 Such a summary dismissal counts as a 
decision on the merits,78 binding on lower courts as to “the precise issues presented 
[to] and necessarily decided by” the Court in concluding that a case presented no 
substantial federal question.79
 Accordingly, a question that has frequently arisen in the post-Windsor wave 
of litigation seeking to vindicate same-sex couples’ constitutional rights to marry and 
to equal protection is whether Baker v. Nelson is dispositive of the constitutionality 
of state marriage exclusions. Defenders of such measures claim that Baker compels 
lower courts to uphold state laws barring same-sex couples from marrying.80
74.     Mark Sherman, Justice Ginsburg: Supreme Court Won’t ‘Duck’ Gay Marriage, seattle 
tImes (July 31, 2014), http://seattletimes.com/html/nationworld/2024212965_ginsburgduck-
xml.html.
75.     See supra text accompanying notes 7, 9. 
76.     Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
77.     Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
78.     E.g., Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 
463, 477 n.20 (1979).
79.     Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam).
80.     See, e.g., Defendant-Intervenors’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 13, Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 3:09-cv-02292); Lynn D. Wardle 
& Lincoln C. Oliphant, In Praise of Loving: Reflections on the “Loving Analogy” for Same-
Sex Marriage, 51 hoW. l.J. 117, 137−43 (2007); Chad Muir, Note, Perry v. Schwarzenegger: 
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 Yet the Supreme Court has articulated an important exception to the binding 
nature of summary dispositions like that in Baker v. Nelson: the Supreme Court 
has specified in Hicks v. Miranda that a summary dismissal is no longer binding 
“when doctrinal developments indicate otherwise.”81 Some litigants defending 
state marriage exclusions, such as Utah, have argued that the subsequent doctrinal 
developments exception articulated in Hicks has been overruled by the Supreme 
Court in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.82 Rodriguez de 
Quijas stated, “[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet 
appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of 
Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the 
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”83 The Kitchen majority distinguished 
Rodriguez de Quijas on the ground that it was addressing the treatment to be given 
to Supreme Court opinions on the merits, and thus did not “overrul[e] the doctrinal 
developments rule as to summary dispositions.”84
 Judge Kelly dissented from this conclusion in Kitchen, contending “that is 
just another way of stating that a summary disposition is not a merits disposition, 
which is patently incorrect.”85 Had the majority judge made that equivalency 
claim, it would indeed be patently incorrect as a matter of established doctrine. But 
the majority did not say that. What Judge Kelly’s objection overlooks is that the 
Kitchen majority did not distinguish summary decisions from Rodriguez de Quijas 
on the ground that summary affirmances are not “merits disposition[s]”86 but on the 
ground that they are not “opinions on the merits.”87 Because the Court aspires to 
give reasons for its constitutional judgments,88 summary decisions offer no reasons, 
A Judicial Attack on Traditional Marriage, 22 u. Fla. J.l. & pub. pol’y 145, 167 (2011) 
(“[D]istrict court was bound by Baker and therefore should have granted the defendants’ mo-
tion for summary judgment . . . .”).
81.     Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975). Hicks does also endorse the proposition 
that “the lower courts are bound by summary decisions by this Court until such time as the 
Court informs them that they are not.” Id. at 344−45 (internal quotation marks and alterations 
omitted). Presumably the Court “informs” lower courts they are no longer bound to a conclu-
sion that a constitutional claim is insubstantial via decisions that “indicate” this. Id.
82.     See, e.g., Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1253 n.2 (10th Cir. 2014) (citing Rodri-
guez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)).
83.     Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484.
84.     Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1232, 1253 n.2 (citing Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484).
85.     Id. at 1232 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
86.     Id. (Kelly, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
87.     Id. at 1253 n.2 (emphasis added).
88.     Cf. Earl M. Maltz, The Function of Supreme Court Opinions, 37 hous. l. rev. 1395, 
1402 (2000) (“The Court is expected not only to determine the victor in the specific lawsuit 
before it, but also to provide standards to guide lower courts in disposing of similar contro-
versies that may arise in the future.”). Admittedly, “a substantial number of cases are resolved 
[without a statement of reasons from any of the Justices], either because the Court disposes of 
them summarily or (much more rarely) because the Court divides equally on an issue.” Id. at 
1396.
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Rodriguez de Quijas did not say that it was overruling Hicks’s subsequent doctrinal 
developments rule, and Rodriguez de Quijas’s pronunciamento and the regime it 
contemplates have been cogently criticized as unsound,89 the Kitchen majority’s 
distinction appears proper and the Hicks rule intact.
 While the subsequent doctrinal developments rule thus remains, the Supreme 
Court has given little express guidance on how strongly doctrinal developments must 
“indicate” that a summary dismissal is no longer binding. But it should not be the case 
that the doctrinal developments sufficient to indicate that such a dismissal is no longer 
binding need be strong enough to dictate a decision upholding the right claimed in the 
case dismissed before lower courts can address the merits of similar disputes. 
 To be specific in this context: the plaintiffs in Baker v. Nelson had argued 
that Minnesota’s exclusion of them from civil marriage violated their rights to 
equal protection and due process protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the 
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected these claims.90 The Supreme Court dismissed 
their appeal in 1972, ruling without opinion that it did not present a substantial 
federal question.91 Unless subsequent developments in the Supreme Court’s equal 
protection and due process jurisprudence indicate otherwise, the propositions 
necessarily decided by the Supreme Court in Baker remain binding on state and 
lower federal courts, which would then have to rule against marriage plaintiffs 
presenting indistinguishable legal issues.
 But we should not think that lower courts can escape Baker through 
the subsequent doctrinal developments exception only if later Supreme Court 
decisions inexorably compel the conclusion that state marriage exclusions actually 
do violate same-sex couples’ equal protection or due process rights. Unlike most 
merits dismissals, summary dismissals contain no legal reasoning, but merely a 
conclusion. The conclusion in Baker v. Nelson was not simply that Minnesota’s 
marriage exclusion did not violate the plaintiffs’ rights, but the broader conclusion 
that the plaintiffs’ claim that Minnesota did violate their rights did not even raise 
a constitutional question of substance. Accordingly, for an unreasoned summary 
dismissal to be adjudged no longer binding, it should be enough that subsequent 
doctrinal developments “indicate” that the types of claims at issue do, under those 
later developed doctrines, present a substantial federal question.92 It should not be 
necessary for the subsequent developments to go further and establish unequivocally 
that the plaintiffs should now win on the merits of their federal constitutional 
claim. This is particularly true since the Supreme Court has ruled that summary 
89.     See, e.g., C. Steven Bradford, Following Dead Precedent: The Supreme Court’s Ill-
Advised Rejection of Anticipatory Overruling, 59 Fordham l. rev. 39 (1990); cf. Jonathan L. 
Entin, Insubstantial Questions and Federal Jurisdiction: A Footnote to the Term-Limits De-
bate, 2 nev. l.J. 608, 617 (2002) (“[T]he Supreme Court has elided the distinction between 
jurisdiction and the merits when the substantiality of a federal question is at issue.”).
90.     Baker v. Nelson, 185 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
91.     Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
92.     Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 518 (1973) (“[P]revious Supreme Court decisions that 
merely render claims of doubtful or questionable merit do not render them insubstantial.”).
176
   Spring 2015                Flotsam in the Tidal Wave of Windsor’s Wake
affirmances are “not of the same precedential value as would be an opinion of this 
Court treating the question on the merits.”93 
 And this appears to be the understanding of most courts confronted with 
post-Windsor challenges to state marriage exclusions. For example, U.S. District 
Judge Robert J. Shelby analyzed Baker v. Nelson in the challenge to Utah’s marriage 
exclusions, Kitchen v. Herbert, and concluded “that there is no longer any doubt that 
the issue currently before the court in this lawsuit presents a substantial question 
of federal law.”94 U.S. District Judge Terence C. Kern concluded in the Oklahoma 
litigation Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder that “[i]t seems clear that what was 
once deemed an ‘unsubstantial’ question in 1972 would now be deemed ‘substantial’ 
based on intervening developments in Supreme Court law.”95 As the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit summarized the rule when it affirmed the decision 
holding Virginia’s marriage exclusion laws unconstitutional, “[s]ummary dismissals 
lose their binding force when ‘doctrinal developments’ illustrate that the Supreme 
Court no longer views a question as unsubstantial, regardless of whether the Court 
explicitly overrules the case.”96 And in holding that it was legitimate for it to reach 
the merits of the challenge to Utah’s marriage exclusions, which it affirmed were 
unconstitutional, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that, 
“[a]lthough reasonable judges may disagree on the merits of the same-sex marriage 
question, we think it is clear that doctrinal developments foreclose the conclusion 
that the issue is, as Baker determined, wholly insubstantial.”97
 Regardless of the precise strength of the “indications” from post-Baker v. 
Nelson Supreme Court decisions, there is an especially strong case that at least 
Baker’s equal protection holding is no longer binding.98 At the time the Court 
decided Baker, it had been less than a year since the Court had first found that a law 
that discriminated against women violated the Equal Protection Clause;99 the Court 
93.     Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974).
94.     Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1195 (D. Utah 2013), aff’d, 755 F.3d 1193 
(10th Cir. 2014).
95.     Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1276 (N.D. Okla. 2014), 
aff’d sub nom. Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014).
96.     Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 373 (4th Cir. 2014).
97.     Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1208 (10th Cir. 2014).
98.     See Robert E. Rains, The Legal Status of Same-Sex Married Couples in Pennsylva-
nia After the U.S. Supreme Court Decision in the DOMA Case, 85 pa. b.a. q. 1, 13 (2014) 
(“Clearly, Romer, Lawrence, and especially Windsor constitute enormous doctrinal develop-
ments for the rights of gays and lesbians in the United States since Baker was decided.”). By 
saying this I by no means intend to imply that doctrinal developments have left insubstantial 
the question whether state marriage exclusions violate the fundamental right to marry of 
same-sex couples.
99.     Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), was decided on October 10, 1972, while Reed v. 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding unconstitutional an Idaho estate administrator law categor-
ically preferring men over women of equally close relationship to decedents), was decided on 
November 22, 1971.
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did not explicitly adopt intermediate scrutiny for laws that (as laws barring same-sex 
couples from marrying do) discriminate on the basis of sex until 1976;100 the Court 
did not apply the Equal Protection Clause to prohibit a law that discriminated on the 
basis of sexual orientation (as virtually all courts have concluded laws excluding 
same-sex couples from marriage do) until two decades later with Romer v. Evans 
in 1996;101 and a number of commentators have taken Romer to apply more than 
minimal rational basis review.102
100.     Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). This is relevant because marriage exclusions do 
categorize on the basis of sex, an argument with much academic support, see, e.g., Andrew 
Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 
n.y.u. l. rev. 197, 214 (1994); Deborah A. Widiss, Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt & Douglas 
NeJaime, Exposing Sex Stereotypes in Recent Same-Sex Marriage Jurisprudence, 30 harv. 
J.l. & gender 461, 505 (2007) (concluding that “the facial discrimination implicit in the sex-
based classifications in state marriage laws is clear”), though limited through recently increas-
ing judicial acceptance, compare, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479−96 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(Berzon, J., concurring) (accepting sex discrimination argument), Jernigan v. Crane, No. 4:13-
cv-00410 KGB, 2014 WL 6685391, at *23−24 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 25, 2014) (same), Lawson v. 
Kelly, No. 14-0622-CV-W-ODS, 2014 WL 5810215, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2014) (same), 
Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, No. 4:14-CV-04081-KES, 2014 WL 6386903, at *10 (D.S.D. Nov. 
14, 2014) (same), Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1206 (D. Utah 2013) (conclud-
ing Utah marriage exclusion discriminated on basis of sex), aff’d on other grounds, 755 F.3d 
1193 (10th Cir. 2014), Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993) (accepting sex discrimination 
argument), and Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 904−06 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“[T]his is a straightforward case of sex discrimination.”), with 
Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1139−40 (D. Or. 2014) (rejecting sex discrimina-
tion argument in dicta in case where court held Oregon’s marriage exclusion unconstitution-
ally discriminated on basis of sexual orientation), Wolf v. Walker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 1008 
(W.D. Wis. 2014) (citing cases for proposition that “the sex discrimination theory has been 
rejected by most courts to consider it, even those ruling in favor of the plaintiffs on other 
grounds” but not finding it necessary to reach the issue), In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 
436−39 (Cal. 2008) (rejecting sex discrimination argument in dicta where a court held Cali-
fornia marriage exclusion unconstitutional under strict scrutiny applicable under state equal 
protection guarantee), and Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 10−12 (N.Y. 2006) (rejecting 
sex discrimination argument). Justice Kennedy, at least, finds the question of whether the 
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage is, constitutionally speaking, sex discrimina-
tion, to be “a difficult question that [he has] been trying to wrestle with.” Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 13, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144).
101.     517 U.S. 620 (1996).
102.     See, e.g., Caren G. Dubnoff, Romer v. Evans: A Legal and Political Analysis, 15 laW 
& Ineq. 275, 296 (1997) (“[T]he Court [in Romer] perceived no need to utilize its traditional 
two-tiered analytic framework nor did it need to explicitly invoke either strict scrutiny or a 
rational basis test. Instead, the Court implicitly drew elements from each.”); Andrew Kop-
pelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 Wm. & mary bIll rts. J. 89, 93 (1997) 
(“The Court’s opinion [in Romer] implicitly invokes a defect in the political process that 
contaminates, at least to some extent, all laws that discriminate against gays. That contamina-
tion, however, implies that gays ought to be a ‘suspect class,’ and that laws discriminating 
against gays should be presumptively unconstitutional.”); Nancy C. Marcus, Deeply Rooted 
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 The first lower court decision to engage with Baker after the Supreme 
Court decided Windsor was U.S. District Judge Robert Shelby’s opinion holding 
Utah’s marriage exclusions unconstitutional in Kitchen v. Herbert.103 Although 
Judge Shelby could have relied solely on arguments like the foregoing, which he 
made,104 he chose also to take guidance from—or perhaps seek cover beneath—
Windsor, which he treated as a “significant doctrinal development.”105 The precise 
development is not spelled out in his Baker analysis, but he takes apparent comfort 
from the fact that some Supreme Court Justices, including dissenters Roberts and 
Scalia, foresaw post-Windsor marriage litigation challenging state exclusions,106 
coupled with the Supreme Court’s reliance on standing doctrine to dismiss the 
appeal in Hollingsworth v. Perry107 rather than dismissing it on the strength of 
Baker for not presenting a substantial federal question.108
 The latter argument is not strong. If, as the Court held in Perry, the 
proponents who were trying to defend California’s marriage ban lacked Article III 
standing, the Court would lack jurisdiction over their appeal. Thus, the Court would 
not have the constitutional authority to render judgment on the merits of that case.109 
Since a ruling that a case does not present a substantial federal question is, as noted 
Principles of Equal Liberty, Not “Argle-Bargle”: The Inevitability of Marriage Equality After 
Windsor, 23 tul. J.l. & sexualIty 17, 35 (2014) (“The Court in Romer engaged in a less 
deferential form of rational basis review . . . .”); Timothy M. Tymkovich, John Daniel Dailey 
& Paul Fraley, A Tale of Three Theories: Reason and Prejudice in the Battle Over Amendment 
2, 68 colo. l. rev. 287, 333 (1997); Peter J. Smith, Note, The Demise of Three-Tiered Re-
view: Has the Supreme Court Adopted a “Sliding Scale” Approach Toward Equal Protection 
Jurisprudence?, 23 J. contemp. l. 475, 476 (1997) (“Romer v. Evans reflected an enhanced 
version of the rational basis inquiry . . . .”). But see, e.g., Larry Alexander, Sometimes Better 
Boring and Correct: Romer v. Evans as an Exercise of Ordinary Equal Protection Analysis, 
68 u. colo. l. rev. 335 (1997); Nan D. Hunter, Proportional Equality: Readings of Romer, 
89 ky. l.J. 885, 891, 895 (2001) (“[Romer v. Evans] did not apply heightened scrutiny to 
classifications based on sexual orientation. . . . One of the paradoxes of the Court’s decision 
in Romer is the contrast between the simplicity of what we understand as the normal rational 
basis test and the complications of the Court’s deployment of it in the opinion. . . . Romer’s 
reasoning is multidimensional, not linear, in the way that it alters the logic of equal protection 
analysis.”).
103.     961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013).
104.     Id. at 1194−95.
105.     Id. at 1195.
106.     Id.
107.     133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
108.     Kitchen, 961 F. Supp. 2d at 1195.
109.     Cf. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308, 315 (1902) (“[T]he 
unsubstantiality of the Federal question for the purpose of the motion to dismiss and its 
unsubstantiality for the purpose of the motion to affirm are one and the same thing . . . . [T]
he better practice is to cause our decree to respond to the question which arises first in order 
for decision, that is, the motion to dismiss [for lack of jurisdiction due to want of a substantial 
federal question].”).
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above, a ruling on the merits,110 the Supreme Court arguably had no power to issue 
a Baker-based dismissal in Perry, even if Baker were still good law. Moreover, 
the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the Perry case relied 
on the fact that same-sex couples in California enjoyed a right to marry under the 
California Constitution prior to Proposition 8 taking that right away and enshrining 
that deprivation in the state constitution.111 This differs from the situation in Baker 
v. Nelson, where same-sex couples were simply excluded from marriage by state 
statutory law.112 Thus, even were Baker binding, it would not necessarily establish 
the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8, and the Supreme Court’s failure 
to invoke Baker as the basis for dismissing Perry by itself need not signify that 
Baker no longer requires courts to uphold a straightforward exclusion of same-sex 
couples from civil marriage.113
 Similarly, in Bishop v. United States ex rel. Holder, the next post-Windsor 
opinion to consider Baker, Judge Terence C. Kern of the Northern District of 
Oklahoma held that “Baker v. Nelson is not binding precedent.”114 After providing a 
persuasive account of the doctrinal developments that supported this conclusion,115 
including Windsor itself, due to its constitutional reasoning that the federal 
government’s discrimination against married same-sex couples “demean[ed]” 
them,116 Judge Kern reasoned much as Judge Shelby had about Windsor’s import: 
“If Baker is binding, lower courts would have no reason to apply or distinguish 
Windsor, and all this judicial hand-wringing [in the Roberts and Scalia dissents] 
over how lower courts should apply Windsor would be superfluous.”117
 Chief Judge Robert C. Chambers of the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of West Virginia followed suit in McGee v. Cole.118 Ruling on a summary 
judgment motion in a case challenging that state’s marriage exclusions, he too 
110.     See supra text accompanying notes 78−79.
111.     Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
112.     Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (denial of marriage license pursuant to 
Minnesota state statute), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
113.     Moreover, Baker v. Nelson involved an appeal as of right from the Minnesota Supreme 
Court to the U.S. Supreme Court. Due to statutory changes, such appeals as of right are now 
quite rare. In Perry, in contrast, the Court had exercised its discretion over its jurisdiction to 
grant certiorari to hear the case. Cf. Francisco Ed. Lim, Determining the Reach and Content 
of Summary Decisions, 8 rev. lItIg. 165, 166−67 (1989) (distinguishing appellate jurisdic-
tion from certiorari jurisdiction with respect to precedential value). This difference also may 
counsel against attributing much significance to the Court’s not invoking Baker to dispose of 
Perry.
114.     962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1274 (N.D. Okla. 2014).
115.     See id. at 1276 (addressing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), Romer v. Evans, 517 
U.S. 620 (1996), and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)).
116.     Id. (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013)).
117.     Id. at 1277.
118.     993 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D. W. Va. 2014).
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concluded that “Baker is nonbinding” on the basis of doctrinal developments.119 Judge 
Chambers recounted the analysis from the Second Circuit in its Windsor decision 
(prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling),120 but went on to recount and rely upon Kitchen’s 
and Bishop’s “persuasive” reasoning about how Windsor demonstrated the Justices’ 
expectations that lower courts would reason about state marriage bans based on 
Windsor (rather than Baker).121 McGee also dismissed contrary lower court decisions 
about Baker both as substantively incorrect and as distinguishable precisely because 
they were rendered before the additional “doctrinal development” of Windsor.122 
 With no new analysis of its own, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia concluded (before granting the plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment) in Bostic v. Rainey that “doctrinal developments in the question of who 
among our citizens are permitted to exercise the right to marry have foreclosed the 
previously precedential nature of the summary dismissal in Baker.”123 Judge Arenda 
L. Wright Allen relied in Bostic on the analyses in the Second Circuit Windsor 
decision and the Kitchen, Bishop, and McGee decisions.124
 Likewise, De Leon v. Perry, the next pro-marriage equality decision to 
consider Baker v. Nelson, also ruled that “Baker is not controlling.”125 The U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Texas considered the same sort of 
doctrinal developments addressed above, including the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Windsor,126 made the same dubious “failure to dismiss for want of substantial 
federal question” argument Kitchen made about Hollingsworth v. Perry,127 and 
expressly aligned itself with Bostic, Bishop, and Kitchen.128
119.     Id. at 650.
120.     Id.
121.     Id. at 651.
122.     See id. (“Both cases preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor [sic], a deci-
sion which, as explained above, showed additional doctrinal development in relevant juris-
prudence. The Court disagrees with the analysis of doctrinal developments conducted in those 
two cases and accordingly finds that Baker is not binding on the current case and does not 
justify abstention here.”). 
123.     970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 470 (E.D. Va. 2014).
124.     Id. at 469−70 & n.7.
125.     975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 648 (W.D. Tex. 2014). 
126.     See id. at 647−48.
127.     Id. at 648−49.
128.     Id. De Leon v. Perry stated that Bourke v. Beshear also “reject[ed] the argument that 
Baker still has precedential value and bars courts from addressing the issue of same-sex mar-
riage.” Id. (citing Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014), rev’d sub nom. 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014)). The district court in Bourke, however, did 
not analyze whether Baker was no longer controlling due to doctrinal developments after 
that decision. Rather, Bourke distinguished Baker as involving the constitutionality of a state 
refusal to issue a same-sex couple a marriage license, whereas the Bourke plaintiffs were 
lawfully married in other states and asking Kentucky to recognize and treat them as married. 
Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 543, 549 & n.13.
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 DeBoer v. Snyder continued the clear trend by rejecting the defendants’ 
Baker argument in a footnote that extensively quoted and expressly adopted 
Kitchen’s analysis, including Kitchen’s reliance on Windsor.129 The court in Latta 
v. Otter pointed to the same doctrinal developments these cases have noted, again 
including Windsor itself; in Latta, U.S. Chief Magistrate Judge Candy Wagahoff 
Dale stated that “the Court dramatically changed tone [in Windsor] with regard 
to laws that withhold marriage benefits from same-sex couples.”130 In addition to 
recycling the Hollingsworth v. Perry argument, Latta considered significant both 
Windsor’s equal protection reasoning and its affirmance of the Second Circuit panel 
decision that had held Baker no longer controlling.131 And after remarking upon 
the unanimity to that point of lower court rejections of Baker after the Supreme 
Court’s Windsor decision, the district court concluded that “Baker is not controlling 
and does not bar review of Plaintiffs’ claims.”132 U.S. District Judge John E. Jones 
III fell in line on May 20, 2014, rejecting the defendants’ Baker argument before 
holding Pennsylvania’s marriage ban unconstitutional in Whitewood v. Wolf.133 He 
too included the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor as part of a “sea change” in 
the Supreme Court’s equal protection and substantive due process doctrine.134
 Senior (former Chief) District Judge Barbara B. Crabb conducted an 
extensive analysis of Windsor’s relevance to the Baker issue in her opinion holding 
Wisconsin’s marriage law unconstitutional in Wolf v. Walker on June 6, 2014.135 
After explaining why “[i]t would be an understatement to say that the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence on issues similar to those raised in Baker has developed 
substantially since 1972[,]” Judge Crabb turned to Windsor.136 She observed that 
Baker’s bindingness was hotly contested, with the “no longer binding” camp 
prevailing in Windsor in the Second Circuit and the marriage exclusionists137 
renewing their arguments before the Supreme Court.138 Judge Crabb noted that 
129.     973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 773 n.6 (E.D. Mich. 2014), rev’d, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014). 
The district court in Geiger v. Kitzhaber likewise dispatched Baker in a footnote, quoting 
Kitchen’s conclusion on this point and merely citing DeBoer, Bishop, De Leon, and Bostic. 
994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133 n.1 (D. Or. 2014).
130.     19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1066−67 (D. Idaho 2014). 
131.     Id. at 1067−68.  
132.     Id.
133.     992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 419, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014). Judge Jones had earlier rejected the 
Baker argument when he rejected the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Whitewood v. Wolf, No. 
1:13-cv-01861-JEJ, at 6 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2013). His May 20, 2014, opinion reiterated his 
arguments from his November 15, 2013, order. Whitewood, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 419. 
134.     Whitewood, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 420. 
135.     986 F. Supp. 2d 982 (W.D. Wis. 2014).
136.     Id. at 990.
137.     David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 cal. l. rev. 997, 1078 (2002) 
(defining “marriage exclusionists” as “those people who would continue to exclude same-sex 
couples” from civil marriage). 
138.     Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 990.
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Justice Ginsburg cut off counsel in Hollingsworth v. Perry when he tried to address 
Baker at oral argument.139 (Though this may well bear on the predictive question 
of whether a majority of the Justices would conclude that state marriage bans, 
including California’s Proposition 8 at issue in Perry, are constitutional, a single 
Justice’s views about doctrinal developments140 would not themselves seem to be a 
“doctrinal development” in the sense relevant to the vitality vel non of a summary 
dismissal.) Windsor itself did not address Baker, and for Judge Crabb, “[t]he Court’s 
silence is telling.”141 In her view, “the Court’s failure to even acknowledge Baker 
as relevant in a case involving a restriction on marriage between same-sex persons 
supports a view that the Court sees Baker as a dead letter.”142 And, like the Kitchen 
and Bishop courts, Judge Crabb also apparently deemed it relevant that the Windsor 
dissenters’ advice to lower court judges did not even bother to suggest that Baker 
could provide a basis for ruling against marriage equality plaintiffs.143 
 In the Kitchen litigation against Utah’s marriage exclusions, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s constitutional rulings 
one day shy of a year after the Supreme Court’s decision in Windsor.144 Like 
virtually all courts to examine Baker in the wake of Windsor, the court of appeals 
concluded emphatically that “it is clear that doctrinal developments foreclose the 
conclusion that the issue is, as Baker determined, wholly insubstantial.”145 The 
court of appeals agreed with the district court that Baker had been superseded by 
subsequent doctrinal developments, but it relied on “[t]wo landmark decisions 
by the Supreme Court,” Lawrence v. Texas and United States v. Windsor.146 The 
disposition in Windsor allowed the court of appeals in Kitchen to distinguish the 
views of “several courts” that before Windsor found Baker binding from the
139.     Id.
140.     Id. (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 
(2013) (No. 12-144) (Ginsburg, J.) (“Mr. Cooper, Baker v. Nelson was 1971. The Supreme 
Court hadn’t even decided that gender-based classifications get any kind of heightened scru-
tiny.”)). 
141.     Id.
142.     Id. at 990−91.
143.     Id. at 991. Senior District Judge John G. Heyburn II cited Wolf and echoed many of 
its arguments about Windsor in his opinion holding unconstitutional Kentucky’s laws barring 
same-sex couples from marrying. Love v. Beshear, 989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 541−42 (W.D. Ky. 
2014) (concluding that “a virtual tidal wave of pertinent doctrinal developments has swept 
across the constitutional landscape” and making Wolf’s argument about Windsor’s silence 
regarding Baker).
144.     Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1229−30 (10th Cir. 2013).
145.     Id. at 1208. The same panel of judges on the same court reached the same decision 
in Bishop v. Smith, treating the litigation against Oklahoma’s marriage exclusions “largely 
controlled by our decision in Kitchen.” 760 F.3d 1070, 1079 (10th Cir. 2014).
146.     Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1205−08 (citing 539 U.S. 558 (2003), 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013)).
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views of “nearly every federal court to have considered the issue” after Windsor.147 
Recognizing that Windsor addressed the constitutionality of a federal marriage 
exclusion, as distinguished from the state marriage exclusions at issue in Kitchen, 
the court of appeals properly noted that “the Court’s description of the issue [in 
Windsor] indicates that its holding was not solely based on the scope of federal 
versus state powers.”148 The court of appeals concluded that “the similarity between 
the claims at issue in Windsor and those asserted by the plaintiffs in this case cannot 
be ignored”; some of the plaintiffs sought recognition of their valid marriages from 
marriage equality states, as Edie Windsor had from the federal government, and all 
of the plaintiffs argued, in Windsorian terms, “that the state’s differential treatment 
of them as compared to opposite-sex couples demeans and undermines their 
relationships and their personal autonomy.”149 Thus, Baker’s holding that marriage 
equality plaintiffs present no substantial federal question was no longer good law 
after Windsor.150
 The same day that the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled in 
Kitchen, Chief Judge Richard L. Young of the Southern District of Indiana also 
held in Baskin v. Bogan that Baker v. Nelson was stripped of its binding character 
by subsequent doctrinal developments.151 After retreading ground covered by 
prior opinions,152 Chief Judge Young confidently concluded that “in the last year 
even more has changed in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence shedding any doubt 
regarding the effect of Baker.”153 Besides questionably relying on Hollingsworth 
v. Perry’s dismissal of the appeal for want of standing rather than for want of a 
substantial federal question,154 the court referred to the substantive, dignity- and 
equality-based reasoning of United States v. Windsor.155
147.     Id. at 1205−06. The court of appeals noted at the close of a string cite that the sole 
case at that time to have ruled differently on Baker after Windsor failed to consider whether 
doctrinal developments had deprived Baker of precedential force. Id. (citing Merritt v. Attor-
ney Gen., No. 13–00215–BAJ–SCR, 2013 WL 6044329, at *2 (M.D. La. Nov. 13, 2013)).
148.     Id. at 1206.
149.     Id. at 1207−08.
150.     Judge Kelly in dissent purportedly rejected the conclusion that subsequent doctrinal 
developments had deprived Baker v. Nelson of binding force. See id. at 1230−33 (Kelly, J., 
dissenting). Somewhat inconsistently, however, Judge Kelly went on to address the merits of 
the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, ostensibly “[b]ecause [he] ha[d] not persuaded the panel.” 
Id. at 1233−40. Presumably the point of this was to show that if he were to find himself free 
to reach the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, though he is not, he would reject them.
151.     12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1154−55 (S.D. Ind. 2014).
152.     See id. at 1153−56 (addressing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582 (2003); Romer 
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344–45 (1975); Baker v. 
Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)).
153.     Id. at 1154.
154.     Id. at 1155.
155.     See id. at 1154−55 (citing United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693−94 (2013) 
(Windsor reasoned DOMA’s non-recognition of couples validly married by a state “de-
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